CONTEXT Ample research suggests that most decisions are based on heuristics-simple rules of thumb-that violate prescriptions of logic and probability theory and should therefore be avoided. Yet findings on decision making in everyday work contexts support the idea that heuristics are in fact the very basis of good decision making if adapted to the challenges and performance criteria of the specific work domain. Because traditional pedagogies aim at circumventing heuristics in (clinical) decision making, ways in which to improve the use of heuristics via (medical) education have rarely been explored.
CONTEXT Ample research suggests that most decisions are based on heuristics-simple rules of thumb-that violate prescriptions of logic and probability theory and should therefore be avoided. Yet findings on decision making in everyday work contexts support the idea that heuristics are in fact the very basis of good decision making if adapted to the challenges and performance criteria of the specific work domain. Because traditional pedagogies aim at circumventing heuristics in (clinical) decision making, ways in which to improve the use of heuristics via (medical) education have rarely been explored.
OBJECTIVE To describe the rationale for teaching and learning proper use of heuristics, rather than stigmatising them, and to identify principles and potential implications for the design and improvement of pedagogies for training in clinical decision making.
RESULTS Based on theory and evidence concerning heuristic decision making in everyday work domains, we suggest that heuristics should not be avoided as irrational or a mere source of errors, in particular in domains where errors are unavoidable. Instead, we should teach and learn how to use heuristics to make fewer and 'smarter' mistakes rather than 'dumb' ones. Based on concepts borrowed from signal detection and control theory, we demonstrate that, to improve heuristic decision making, teaching should focus on differential diagnoses and learning from feedback and mistakes, in teams and in contextually rich settings where the frequencies, costs and trade-offs between different types of errors (misses versus false alarms) can be experienced. We discuss three possible teaching formats and how to best implement them based on our findings.
CONCLUSIONS
The most promising way to train (future) physicians and other health professionals in clinical decision making is not to circumvent heuristics or correct deviations from logic and probability theory but to enhance the use of heuristics by improving perspicacity, that is, by tuning the (recognition) processes that underlie the domain-specific adaptive selection of heuristics and management of ensuing errors.
It has long been recognised that in complex work domains such as health care, decision makers often deviate from the normative prescriptions of logic or probability theory, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] typically resorting to simple, non-optimal strategies that have been variously characterised as intuitive, muddling through, heuristic, fuzzy, boundedly rational, situated or recognition-primed. Thus, an interesting debate relative to training (future) physicians and health professionals in clinical decision making is not about what people do, but about what people ought to do.
Many researchers have suggested that good decision making should conform to ideals of logic and probability theory. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] Training should thus alert decision makers to generic human biases (e.g. availability and representativeness), warn them about the potential for error associated with these biases, and increase knowledge and appreciation of less-biased strategies. 13 In short, the focus should be on circumventing heuristics in order to reduce (opportunities for) errors that occur in the form of deviations from logical rationality. However, one of the main proponents of this classical approach to decision making puts its implications for training in perspective by stating that '[o]ur ability to de-bias people is quite limited'.
14 In fact, rather than educating people on how to avoid heuristics and related errors, the most promising strategy for improving decision making based on the classical approach is to nudge behaviour. 15 The concept of nudging refers to a design of decision environments 'that alter[s] [. . .] people's behavior in a predictable way' without incentivising, mandating or restricting choices 15 (p. 6) . Important for our present discussion is that nudging aims to facilitate better decisions without training to improve decision-making competencies.
A more productive approach for medical education comes from research on decision making that is grounded in everyday work contexts, where we and others have shown that experts actually use heuristics as smart adaptations to the complexities of a specific domain. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] This perspective is based on the finding that heuristics work well in some but not all circumstances, and that expert performance depends on the adaptive selection of heuristics 6, 18, 19 and the management of ensuing errors. 20, 22 This finding underlines Eva and Norman's conclusion that in training, 'successful heuristics should be embraced rather than overcome'. 17 Training should therefore not aim to circumvent the use of heuristics or to nudge decision makers toward more logical decisions. Instead, training should increase the perspicacity of the student with regard to heuristic decision making; that is, tune the (recognition) processes that underlie the adaptive selection of heuristics and management of errors in the domain of interest. Approaches to fostering individual decision-making competencies have recently been referred to as boosting. 23 The goal of this article is to explore the idea of boosting in the context of clinical decision making and to identify general principles for designing training pedagogies that would help clinicians to improve their use of heuristics.
For this article, we develop principles for how to improve the use of heuristics based on our own research in emergency medicine. 20 With a focus on patient management, we select examples that show how emergency physicians adaptively switch between heuristics that help trade-off care efficiency and safety (using two relatively general diagnostic categories) rather than make a specific diagnosis. The identified principles can, conceptually, be generalised to situations with more than two differential diagnostic categories or more or less specific diagnostic categories, depending on specialty and situational requirements. We first develop a theoretical prescription for how people ought to make decisions that is suitable for training in heuristic decision making. Based on this theoretical perspective, we identify pedagogical elements necessary in the design of training systems for heuristic decision making. Finally, we discuss three common clinical teaching formats with a focus on how to implement the identified elements in actual teaching situations. Our conceptual presentation may be used for both (re)designing clinical teaching formats and as a pedagogical tool for improving the effectiveness of courses on the mechanisms underlying clinical decision making.
HOW HEURISTICS OUGHT TO BE USED
In contrast to the logical puzzles with well-defined solutions that have typically been used in laboratory decision-making research, the problems faced by most physicians and health professionals are ill defined. Ill-defined problems are marked by uncertainty multiple, often contradictory performance criteria and limited resources, so that optimal decisions may not exist or cannot be identified within practical or realistic constraints. 24 Lopes suggests that the normative logic of deduction and induction that works for comparatively simple logical puzzles will not work for the kinds of ill-defined problems physicians and other health professionals face in clinical settings. 25 She also suggests that ill-defined problems are essentially problems related to differential diagnosis; that is, to pulling out the 'signal' (i.e. the patient's actual condition) from a noisy background (i.e. the myriad potential conditions that a patient might have). In addition, without a clear-cut performance criterion, ill-defined problems require agents to decide whether and when a decision is good enough; that is, when decision making can be brought to a close because the resulting decision conforms to all situation-relevant standards and can be implemented with the given resources. Let's consider an example.
In his field study on decision making in the emergency department (ED), Feufel 20 observes that, in many cases, ED physicians manage ill-defined problems using two alternative heuristic strategies: (i) a Common Thing heuristic, and (ii) a Worst Case heuristic. Concerning differential diagnosis, the Common Thing heuristic aligns well with classical Bayesian norms. 26 It suggests that the hypotheses guiding treatment should reflect a judgement on what is most likely based on prior odds (i.e. disease prevalence) and current observations (i.e. what is most common given the symptoms, medical history, laboratory tests, etc.). Note that this heuristic biases physicians toward a 'confirmatory' search process. That is, their observations are guided by beliefs about what might be the most Common Thing, and the tests and interventions ordered tend to be directed toward yielding evidence confirming the most likely disease or diagnosis.
The Worst Case heuristic shifts the focus of differential diagnosis from the 'likelihood' of a specific disease or diagnosis to the potential consequences associated with different conditions that might share some of the observed symptoms. It is designed to help guard against missing or overlooking a time-sensitive condition that might ultimately lead to serious harm (i.e. Worst Cases). Note that the Worst Case heuristic biases physicians toward a disconfirming search strategy as they attempt to rule out possible Worst Cases, often when simultaneously treating the more likely common thing.
Although each heuristic alone reflects a bounded rationality, their coupling as two strategies in an emergency physician's toolbox forms the basis for a type of rationality that depends on a physician's perspicacity; that is, on how well the selection of and emphasis on a particular heuristic is tuned to the features differentiating Worst Cases and Common Things ( Fig. 1 ) and the criteria determining satisfactory patient management in the ED (Fig. 2 ). Often this tuning cannot be achieved in a one-shot decision. Iterative decisions may be needed, using either of the two heuristics in an adaptive control loop that can help one to evaluate existing expectations regarding Common Things or Worst Cases against the actual situation and revise treatment and evaluation plans, if necessary, until a satisfactory (i.e. effective and safe) solution for the patient can be found. Figure 1 borrows concepts from signal detection theory to illustrate the potential ambiguities associated with discriminating between Worst Cases and Common Things with regard to a patient's condition. The figure shows two overlapping probability distributions relating signals or patterns of evidence to the probability of occurrence of Worst Cases and Common Things. Although some patterns of evidence may allow for clear-cut categorisations (e.g. at the right end and left end of the x-axis), the degree of overlap between the two distributions represents the overlapping or shared symptoms and therefore the potential ambiguity between Worst Cases and Common Things. The more the distributions overlap, the harder it becomes to discriminate between the two possible patient conditions. Less overlap facilitates correct classification and depends, among other factors, on the specificity of symptom patterns (e.g. symptoms related to shingles are more specific than symptoms of a heart attack), disease progression (e.g. symptoms related to early stages of a brain tumor tend to be less specific than symptoms related to later stages) and expertise and experience of the physician or health professional (e.g. experts tend to be better at focusing on specific symptoms than novices would be). 27 Although signal detection theory is formally limited to two disease categories and one-shot categorisations, the concepts that we derive from the theory may, at least conceptually, be extended to more than two diagnostic categories, or to more or less specific diagnostic categories, to help us learn about and teach the diverse challenges of adapting heuristic decision making across different specialties and dynamic clinical situations.
In signal detection theory, the key parameter with respect to the quality of decisions is the line labelled decision criterion (dashed lines in Fig. 1 ). Its placement reflects the criterion that is used to decide whether to focus on patient management (i.e. evaluation and treatment) as a Common Thing or as a Worst Case, and then balance the effort and types of errors that result from this cut-off criterion. Specifically, the decision criterion will determine the trade-off between two types of errors: false alarms, which imply pursuing a Worst Case when the patient's condition is actually consistent with a Common Thing; or misses, which imply a focus on a Common Thing when a Worst Case situation is present. Moving the decision criterion to the right tends to reduce false alarms and evaluation effort while increasing the probability of missing Worst Figure 1 The logic of signal detection theory illustrates the challenge of discriminating disease categories in domains faced with ill-defined problems (e.g. Worst Cases versus Common Things in the emergency department) and how the ensuing types of errors (i.e. misses and false alarms) depend on the decision criterion Cases, whereas moving the criteria to the left tends to reduce the probability of missing a Worst Case while increasing evaluation efforts and false alarms. This suggests that there is neither a 'free lunch' (i.e. minimising errors will increase evaluation efforts and false alarms, and reduced evaluation efforts will increase misses) nor a perfect or errorfree performance. In the long run, errors will occur. The challenge is to minimise the likelihood and frequency of those errors that are most costly in terms of patient outcomes and unnecessary evaluation efforts. 28 To address the question of a satisfactory criterion for discriminating between Common Things and Worst Cases, it is necessary to consider the domain-specific values associated with the potential consequences of an error, as illustrated in the pay-off matrix for our emergency medicine example in Fig. 2 . In this sense, the decision is not simply a function of logic and finding 'truth'. Rather, the decision involves a value-driven trade-off that often raises ethical questions. What costs are associated with the tests that would be required to conclusively rule out all Worst Cases? How severe would the health consequences of missing a potential Worst Case be? Furthermore, the value of a decision can only be assessed and understood over the long run and by repeated practice, because although a decision strategy may work well most of the time, with illdefined problems, it inevitably results in errors at some point (see overlapping distributions in Fig. 1 ).
In summary, a key implication for how heuristics ought to be used and how clinical decision making should be taught is that eliminating all errors is impossible. 28 Over a given period of time, misses and false alarms will both occur, but with a different probability rate depending on where the decision criterion is set. Although perfect performance (zero error) is an unattainable goal, at least two mechanisms can mitigate the likelihood of certain errors and their consequences in the long run: (i) the ability to effectively discriminate between patient states (e.g. Worst Cases versus Common Things), and (ii) the ability to set the decision criterion to reflect the most desirable balance between misses and false alarms. In this sense, a physician's skill in clinical decision making is more a function of perspicacity (i.e. discrimination processes that are well tuned to the demands of the problem to be solved) than rationality (i.e. conformity with logical norms). Implications for training pedagogies are discussed next.
PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Based on the theoretical position outlined above, perfect performance is unrealistic in clinical decision making for at least three reasons: (i) the fact that patterns of symptoms for different disease categories tend to overlap (Fig. 1); (ii) the inevitability of error, and (iii) the fundamental trade-off between false alarms and misses (Fig. 2) . We will now elaborate on each of these challenges in turn and identify the ramifications of each, with respect to both content and pedagogy, in order to understand how to best train (future) physicians and health professionals in clinical decision making.
Training should improve discrimination
The idea that the patterns of symptoms for different disease categories tend to overlap corresponds to the concept of differential diagnosis, which suggests that clinical decision making is not primarily about confirming a correct diagnosis for a pattern of symptoms, but about differentiating between a set of alternative diagnoses for this symptom pattern. We provide a case from Feufel 20 to illustrate the difference (p. 55).
Two physicians talk about a female hospice patient with acute breathing problems.
Attending: Make sure it's not just urosepsis. Let's get a better feel and look at her labs.
Resident
Given the symptom pattern, the physicians ponder whether the patient suffers from a Worst Case-a PE-or whether the patient more likely has a nonlethal Common Thing-'just urosepsis', 'just her nerves' or 'pneumonia'. Rather than testing for one of these options, the physicians focus on ruling out alternatives by ordering basic laboratory tests 'to make sure it's not just urosepsis' and 'to get a better feel' for the probability of a PE.
It goes without saying that the more physicians know about pathophysiology, the better they will be at discriminating among diseases and selecting appropriate treatments. 29 But alas, medical education is commonly organised around main effects associated with a specific discipline (e.g. anatomy, physiology or cardiology), organ (e.g. heart, liver or kidneys) or disease (e.g. causes, symptoms and treatments for indigestion, heart disease, etc.). This emphasis is likely to bias students toward a confirmatory approach that favours evaluation strategies that help identify a specific disease. It goes without saying that it is not good practice to warn learners about the danger of confirmation bias when at the same time providing information in ways that tend to trigger it.
To prepare physicians and other health professionals for clinical decisions, their training should pay increased attention to interaction effects between symptoms and diseases. Rather than focusing on identifying and treating a specific health problem, emphasis should be placed on how to differentiate it from similar problems (differential diagnosis). For example, in addition to describing the causes, symptoms and treatments for urosepsis, it might also be important to draw attention to other diseases with a similar symptom pattern and the signs and tests that best discriminate between the alternatives. Thus, a first implication is that learners should be exposed to clinically relevant interactions between symptoms and diseases and provided with continuous opportunities to practise differential diagnostic thinking and evaluation.
The discussion cited above continues on, and illustrates another feature of clinical decision making that has implications for medical education and developing the ability to discriminate between possible patient conditions. The patient's family arrives. After talking to them, the Resident reports.
Resident:
She Attending: Absolutely.
The physicians check the patient's chest X-ray.
Attending: She has a big hiatal hernia.
Resident: It's humongous [and fills two-thirds of the lung]. Should we scan her today?
Attending: That's fine. If her creatinine is high still, scan her but without contrast.
An hour later the Resident is still waiting for the patient's creatinine value to come back.
Attending: She probably doesn't have a PE. It's the hernia. Talk it over with the consultant. He is gonna want to admit her.
Resident:
The family wants her cleared only.
Attending: . . . Talk to her family. If they say she should go back (. . .) But they might not take her. They can do only certain things; then she needs to go to the hospital. She meets three out of three admission criteria for COPD.
This conversation illustrates a striking difference from the classical notion of decision making. ED physicians almost never reach a decision in isolation, even though they are the ones who make the final decision. 20 Instead, they tend to acquire information within multiprofessional teams (e.g. nurses and colleagues) and with the support of patients, their families 30 and information technologies. 31 Also, ED physicians may often talk to social workers, psychologists, etc., to obtain information that they cannot gather themselves in the limited time they have with their patients. We know, based on research in systems engineering, that a clinic that functions well as a distributed team-where physicians listen to patients and colleagues and communication is well supported by information technologies-has the potential to be far more reliable than any of its individual members. 32, 33 In fact, Leape and colleagues suggest that a physician's lack of respect for colleagues is a major contributing factor to medical error. 34, 35 Similarly, Woolley and colleagues have found that the quality of group problem solving depends critically on listening and taking turns within the group. 36 In summary, rather than thinking of physicians as individual decision makers, we should think of clinical decision making as distributed across a group of professionals with different backgrounds, patients, families, information and alarm technologies. Thus training in 'non-technical' skills related to team coordination and communication and the use of technologies may be as important to the quality of clinical decision making as biomedical knowledge and clinical skills. 37, 38 Being trained as technologysupported teams in differential diagnoses may help staff members of clinics to learn to function as part of a so-called high-reliability system; that is, as part of a system that rarely misses the signal despite a noisy environment. 39 
Errors are inevitable (for learning)
Based on our analysis of heuristic decision making in everyday work contexts, a zero error rate is impossible, and even the best (clinical) work system will make mistakes in the long run. From this perspective, the primary cause of error is not human weakness or irrationality but a direct result of (clinical) complexity, where dangerous Worst Cases will sometimes be masked behind the appearances of a Common Thing and vice versa. In such settings, mistakes are a critical source of information about the fit between the heuristic that is guiding the action and the particular demands of a specific situation. For that reason, training programmes that are predicated on 'zero error' as an educational goal, place students in an unfortunate position with respect to learning. Zero error tolerance typically leads to a 'blame culture', where error is viewed as a symptom of human weakness, which in turn increases the incentive to hide or cover up errors. 40 This inclination to conceal then makes it difficult for individuals, as well as the system itself, to learn from their errors regarding when and how to modify the clinical goals and expectations (e.g. Worst Cases versus Common Things) guiding their actions. Thus, training programmes should shift the emphasis from mistakes as 'errors' (summative feedback that focuses on the number of incorrect or correct classifications) to mistakes as valuable 'information' for improving the process of clinical decision making (continuous formative feedback over time and in different situations). 41 An additional implication of this analysis is that teaching about and learning from errors is never finished. Attempts to learn from mistakes to improve heuristic decision making should be an integral part of both continuing medical education and everyday professional practice. Incident reporting systems and morbidity and mortality (M&M) conferences are ways in which this is routinely carried out. A key to the success of incident reporting and M&M conferences is that their focus is on learning, not on culpability. In summary, for individuals and organisations to function in and as high-reliability systems, it is important for them to maximise their potential to learn from errors. Attempts to eliminate errors suppresses the information necessary for ongoing learning, adaptation and improvement. 41 
Heuristics are best learned in context
If eliminating errors is an unrealistic goal, the key is to 'bias' decision making toward making 'smart' mistakes (e.g. do an ECG [electrocardiogram], even though you are pretty sure a patient is suffering from indigestion) rather than 'dumb' mistakes (e.g. send a patient home with antacids even though he may be suffering from a cardiac episode). To illustrate how this is done in clinical practice, we offer two examples from Feufel 20 that outline ED physicians' cost matrix and how they make 'smart' mistakes. In the first example, an attending ED physician instructs her resident colleague that 'Everybody with some skin thing goes to the derm clinic'. In other words, patients with non-acute problems that fall within the professional responsibility of fellow colleagues should be transferred without elaborate evaluation in the ED. Thanks to the distribution of expertise in the health system, ED physicians can raise the threshold for elaborate evaluation in the ED, preventing unnecessary effort and false alarms without risking missing Worst Cases. Conversely, in the second example, another attending physician increases the intensity of the evaluation procedure and lowers the admission threshold, reasoning that a patient 'is from W. That is 2.5 hours from here [. . .] so I will make sure he's fine if he's going home'. 20 In other words, the physician lowers the decision threshold for ruling out a potential Worst Case in the hospital given that resources for appropriate care at the patient's home are limited and that a Worst Case scenario would require long-distance travel back to the hospital.
One main message that one can get out of these examples is that ED physicians do not set the decision criterion to separate Worst Cases from Common Things based on medical considerations alone. In many cases, the cost matrix associated with balancing false alarms and misses is grounded in the wider sociomaterial context of the clinical situation. This context is defined by the availability of resources (including expertise and time), competing demands (e.g. other patients' needs) and cultural expectations (e.g. professional responsibilities and liability laws), among other factors. Of course, other specialties may differ with respect to the role clinical and contextual features play in their cost matrix. Thus, it is only through engagement with the clinical problem in its particular sociomaterial context that decision makers can learn about the costs of various types of mistakes and how to make 'smart' decisions that reflect clinical values appropriately.
DISCUSSION
According to research that has been carried out on heuristic decision making in everyday work domains that consistently face ill-defined problems, the most natural way to learn clinical decision making is through trial and error. However, in a high-risk environment such as medicine, mistakes can have fatal consequences. For that reason, the challenge for any training programme is to provide continuous opportunities for differential diagnoses and teamwork in context, at the same time maximising learning from errors and minimising potential consequences. There are several pedagogical approaches that reduce the impact but not the probability of mistakes, which simultaneously help learners to appreciate the intimate relationship between knowledge, heuristics and value trade-offs. We will elaborate using three examples: (i) bedside teaching, (ii) case-based learning (CBL), and (iii) simulations. These methods are not new to medical education, but based on our analysis, we attempt to provide a deeper rationale for exactly why they are effective and to specify how they should be used to successfully train physicians and health professionals in clinical decision making. Other approaches (not covered here, but in line with our arguments) include, for instance, the four-component instructional design model (4C/ID) by van Merri€ enboer and colleagues. 42 
Bedside teaching
With this approach, ideally from the very beginning of medical school, groups of medical students (under supervision) work with actual patients and are typically asked to take a history, perform physical examinations, diagnose the patient's condition and prescribe a course of treatment. 43 This approach results not only in enhanced learning of technical skills but also in the learning of non-technical skills (e.g. skills related to team communication or ethical behaviour). The experience with actual patients and the feedback that they get from professionals about their interactions provide a context against which students can see the component skills (e.g. those traditionally taught in classrooms, textbooks and laboratories) as they relate to a clinical problem. Whereas classical approaches assume that, once mastered, individual facts will eventually 'add up' to a holistic decision-making capability, giving learners early and continuous exposure to the full biomedical and sociomaterial complexity of clinical problems-including formative feedback on their performance and the errors they commit-is one method in the medical educator's toolbox that can help to ensure that the facts do add up to increased perspicacity in noisy and uncertain clinical contexts.
Case-based learning (CBL)
In CBL, rather than interacting with actual patients, students are presented with narrative cases (vignettes) as problems to be solved. The narratives generally contain patient background information (e.g. family status and socio-economic status), health information (e.g. vital signs, symptoms and results from laboratory tests) and other relevant components of a clinical setting (e.g. resources and demand). 44, 45 Getting full value from this approach will depend on the selection and construction of cases. Mere descriptions of clear-cut problems with one obvious correct solution will not suffice. Instead, cases should be selected to reflect the frequency distribution of cases in a particular clinical domain and be constructed to 'invite' errors that reflect the tension between domain-specific (heuristic) strategies and interpretations of a clinical presentation. For instance, to train ED physicians, some vignettes should contain hidden Worst Cases that novice physicians are likely to miss. Other vignettes might invite students down a garden path toward a Worst Case when, in fact, they represent a Common Thing. In other words, the cases should be constructed to facilitate learning from experience by increasing learners' awareness of both the frequency distribution of cases in a domain and the strengths and limitations of the strategies available for addressing these cases (e.g. the danger of missing rare cases). In this manner, students can begin to appreciate the need to make 'smart' rather than 'dumb' mistakes. Again, formative feedback concerning students' decisions is essential to realising the benefit of CBL. 41 
Simulations
The growing fidelity and availability of patient simulators provides another opportunity for holistic problem-centered training that does not put patients at risk. 46, 47 In addition to providing handson training for perceptual-motor skills, simulators can be used to create realistic scenarios that embed problems within the full clinical and sociomaterial complexity of the work context. Again, the construction of the simulated scenarios is critical to successful learning. Simulations should be designed to 'invite' mistakes that can illustrate the tension between standard operating procedures (SOPs) and their exceptions in order for learners to get the most benefit from their mistakes. More importantly, simulation scenarios are particularly suited to training students in non-technical skills related to teamwork and prioritisation of clinical tasks because of, for example, limited resources. Only scenarios including such features will help learners appreciate how clinical decision making should (not) be impacted by the availability of team members and other resources. 48 
CONCLUSIONS
To best train (future) physicians and health professionals in clinical decision making, the most important question to understand is what clinical decision makers ought to do. Classical decision theory postulates that training should help circumvent the use of heuristics in order for students to focus on finding the correct diagnosis and eliminating errors. Although this approach has its merits in domains that generally deal with well-defined problems, (Feufel MA, Keller N, Kendel F, Spies CD, Gigerenzer G. How to boost physicians' test interpretation skills. unpublished data) in clinical settings that face illdefined problems an optimal solution may not exist and errors are inevitable, yet manageable. To improve error management, training should leverage errors to help learners tune their clinical heuristics in order to be able to: (i) differentiate between competing explanations for a given set of symptoms (differential diagnosis), and (ii) reduce opportunities for potentially fatal or costly errors. We suggest that this can best be achieved by designing opportunities for students to learn from errors in 'safe' but rich sociomaterial contexts marked by characteristic variations of diseases, symptoms, teams, patients, resources and technologies. This set-up optimises opportunities for discovering the advantages and limitations of heuristics in discriminating between disease categories and the costs associated with different types of errors that inevitably occur with any heuristic. It is in this sense that, to improve clinical decision making in settings that are marked by ill-defined problems, the focus of training should be on improving the use of heuristics and increasing physicians' perspicacity, rather than on circumventing heuristics and conforming to normative models of rationality.
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